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Abstract
We consider the order fulfillment process of a supplier producing a customized
capital good, such as production equipment, commercial aircraft, medical devices, or
defense systems. As common in these industries, prior to receiving a firm purchase
order from the customer, the supplier receives a series of shared forecasts, which
are called ‘soft orders’. Facing a stochastic internal manufacturing lead-time, the
supplier must decide at what time to begin the fulfillment of the order. This deci-
sion requires a trade-oﬀ between starting too early, leading to potential holding or
cancellation costs, and starting too late, leading to potential delay costs. We col-
lect detailed data of shared forecasts, actual purchase orders, production lead-times,
and delivery dates for a supplier-buyer dyad in the semiconductor equipment supply
chain. Under the assumption that the supplier acts rationally, optimally balancing
the cancellation, holding, and delay costs, we are able to estimate the corresponding
imputed cost parameters based on the observed data. Our estimation results reveal
that the supplier perceives the cost of cancellation to be about two times higher and
the holding costs to be about three times higher than the delay cost. In other words,
the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment, which un-
dermines the eﬀectiveness of the overall forecast sharing mechanism.
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1 Introduction1
Many firms selling expensive customized capital goods such as production equipment, com-
mercial aircraft, medical devices, or defense systems, face an order-fulfillment dilemma.
On the one hand, their customers expect them to exhibit a high degree of responsiveness,
requiring product delivery within an aggressive lead-time. On the other hand, the cus-
tomized nature of these products makes it risky for suppliers to keep sub-systems or even
finished goods in inventory, leading to lengthy and stochastic manufacturing lead-times.
To resolve this dilemma, they routinely begin procurement or even production based on
forecasted orders, as opposed to waiting for firm purchase orders from their customers.
Such forecasted orders, sometimes also referred to as “soft orders”, are based on customers’
purchase intent as typically revealed to the supplier’s marketing and sales function.
There exists, however, a substantial diﬀerence between a forecasted (soft) order and a
firm purchase order. Responding to changes in their technology and market environments,
customers may decide to revise the shared forecasted orders, leading to either changes in
purchase quantity, delays in the requested delivery dates, or cancellations of the orders.
This raises an interesting question as to how a supplier should respond to the shared
forecasts in such a volatile environment. Specifically, the supplier must decide on how to
deal with the preliminary nature of a soft order, and - more operationally - define a point in
time (a level of information quality) at which to start the corresponding fulfillment process.
The supplier can start early, facing the risk of the order not materializing (cancellation
cost) or the equipment being finished too early (holding cost), or can delay the starting
time until more information becomes available, thereby facing the risk of being late (delay
cost). Put diﬀerently, the supplier can “Wait and be Late or Rush and be Wrong”, neither
of which seems desirable.
In this article, we report on an empirical study of forecast sharing related to the ac-
1We would like to thank the management teams of the supply-chain dyad who generously provided
their internal data. We are also grateful for the constructive comments by the departmental editor, the
associate editor, and three anonymous referees.
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quisition of customized production equipment for the manufacturing of semiconductors.
Semiconductor equipment is a prototypical example of the industry characteristics out-
lined above. Customers, who are responding to the turbulent environment they face in
the demand for their end-products, press for short customer lead-times, requiring product
delivery within three months or less. At the same time, the complexity and degree of cus-
tomization of the equipment causes manufacturing lead-times to be long and stochastic,
ranging between several months to a whole year.
From an overall 143 soft orders that we collected, 43 were cancelled and thereby never
materialized as business for the supplier. From the remaining 100 soft orders, which ul-
timately were translated into firm purchase orders, another 76 experienced changes with
respect to the delivery date. Taking the perspective of a supplier of customized semicon-
ductor production equipment, we develop a formal model addressing the trade-oﬀ between
an early start of the order fulfillment process (leading to potential cancellation and hold-
ing costs) and a delayed start until more information has become available (leading to a
potential delay cost).
How this trade-oﬀ is resolved depends on the perceived cost structure of the supplier.
While traditionally, the supply chain literature has taken these cost parameters as exoge-
nously given and then searched for the optimal operational decision, we take a ‘reverse
engineering’ approach. Based on empirical observation of the supply chain over time, in-
cluding detailed data of shared forecasts, actual purchase orders, production lead-times,
and delivery dates, and on the assumption that the supplier is a rational actor, we re-
construct the cost parameters that explain the observed supply chain behavior. Our
estimation results reveal that the supplier perceives the cost of cancellation to be about
two times higher and the holding costs to be about three times higher than the delay cost.
In other words, the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment
process, which undermines the eﬀectiveness of the overall forecast sharing mechanism.
Specifically, this paper makes three contributions. First, we formally quantify the eﬀec-
tiveness of an order forecast sharing system in the semiconductor equipment supply chain
and show that it is less eﬀective than one would expect. Fearing order cancellation, the
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supplier, by and large, ignores the preliminary forecast information. Second, to the best of
our knowledge, this research is, within the field of supply chain management, the first to
not only present and analyze a mathematical model, but also to empirically estimate its
cost parameters. Thus in contrast to earlier studies, the cost parameters in our research
are not exogenously defined, but empirically estimated for the semiconductor equipment
supply chain. This novel approach complements the growing literature of supply chain
management by introducing an econometric dimension. Our results can be used by buyers
who want to infer the cost parameters used by their suppliers in responding to the shared
forecast information. Third, we estimate the cost parameters by adopting a ‘structural
approach’ in assuming that the supplier is rational. Consequently, the estimated param-
eters are robust in face of policy changes in the presence of rational expectations (Lucas,
1976).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the semicon-
ductor equipment industry, including the buyer-supplier relationship under investigation.
Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. We present a formal optimization model that
captures the essence of the supplier’s decision problem in Section 4. Section 5 describes
the data and the underlying econometric framework. Section 6 discusses the estimation
results. We validate the model in Section 7, and conduct a policy scenario analysis in
Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Semiconductor Equipment Supply Chain
The demand for semiconductor production equipment is triggered by the demand for the
chip supplier’s end products, such as micro-processors or memory chips. As illustrated
by the recent down-turn in these markets, the demand from PC suppliers exhibits a high
degree of uncertainty, leading to wild adjustments in sales forecasts within a relatively short
period of time. Market forecasts are done monthly or quarterly at large chip manufacturers
for a time period of 2-5 years into the future and are regularly updated following a rolling
horizon principle.
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These product-level demand forecasts are translated into capacity requirements and
allocated to either existing or new wafer fabs. If the allocated demand is not supported
by available capacity, new equipment is ordered. The ordering of the equipment requires
chip manufacturers to consider the peak-load capacity requirements and changes in the
technical process specifications of new chip generations.
While the translation of product demand into equipment orders seems straightforward,
two factors make this computation extremely complex. First, the semiconductor industry
is very capital intense and the capital expenditures for new production equipment are the
single largest item on a company’s earning statement. For example, the industry leader
Intel Inc. spent $5 billion for equipment acquisitions in the year 2000 alone. Given this
magnitude of capital expenditure, even minor under-utilization of equipment can have a
dramatic financial impact.
Second, while most semiconductor equipment in the world is operated 24 hours a day
for 7 days a week, the actual availability of a specific piece of equipment can be lower.
Equipment becomes unavailable as a result of machine break-downs, required qualifica-
tion procedures, engineering trials, preventive maintenance, etc. Moreover, semiconductor
manufacturing is a highly yield-driven process, associated with substantial scrap and the
need for rework. While all these factors reduce the average availability, they also intro-
duce substantial variability into capacity planning, aggravating problems resulting from
the demand uncertainty.
2.1 Equipment Acquisition Process
Once the capacity planning process has generated requests for additional pieces of equip-
ment, an elaborate tool acquisition process commences. This process includes three stages,
namely, forecast sharing, manufacturing, and installation.
During the forecast sharing stage, the chip manufacturer (Buyer) creates a forecasted
order (soft order), which is shared with the equipment manufacturer (supplier) via an
on-line collaboration system. This soft order includes the tool’s specifications, and the
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requested delivery date (RDD). This soft order however is merely preliminary informa-
tion - opposed to a final purchase order - since in the presence of market and capacity
uncertainties, the buyer does not want to commit to an order at such an early stage. The
buyer can, after getting more information about his market demand and production yields,
decide to (a) cancel the order, (b) to move it to another date, (c) or leave the soft order
unchanged.
The supplier becomes aware of the buyer’s purchase intent, both through the on-line
information system as well as through direct customer interaction from its sales and mar-
keting department. At some point she needs to initiate the production of the tool, which
includes procurement of sub-systems from second tier suppliers and the entry of the order
into the production schedule (“slotting”).
The supplier faces a diﬃcult situation, as starting the order too early can lead to holding
and cancellation costs, while starting the order too late can lead to late-shipment costs.
The typical manufacturing lead-time of the supplier ranges between 3 and 5 months. The
lead-time however exhibits a significant variability as a result of diﬀerences in product-mix
going through the supplier’s facility, changes in equipment demand, process generation,
and/or uncertainty in lead-times from the second tier suppliers.
Finally, the tool is shipped to the corresponding fab, where it is installed and must then
move through an elaborate qualification process before it can produce commercial output.
The overall equipment acquisition cycle is illustrated by Figure 1. In total, the equipment
acquisition cycle is approximately one year. Some tools, especially in the lithography
domain, can take even longer.
Note that this equipment acquisition process applies only for tools that have already
been developed and proven their technical feasibility. The buyer uses a diﬀerent contract
for the supplier during the development of a new piece of production technology. One
important diﬀerence between such development contracts and the procurement contracts
as outlined above is that the buyer might fund more than one supplier for the development
of a single tool type. In contrast, once the equipment specification is established, the buyer
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typically switches to a single sourcing approach.
2.2 Quality of Exchanged Information: The Supply-Chain Dyad
The authors conducted a joint research project with a major chip manufacturer and one
of the largest equipment suppliers. After documenting the overall equipment acquisition
process as outlined above, we collected detailed data on the duration of each of the three
stages for a total of 100 tool orders.
Among other data, we collected the forecasted tool orders as shared by the buyer with
the supplier via the on-line collaboration system over an extended period of time. The
buyer provided a quarterly forecast of how many tools he planned to acquire in each of the
coming seven quarters. These forecasts were updated following a rolling horizon principle.
For example, in quarter 4 of 1998 the buyer forecasted her demand for quarters Q1 1999
to Q3 2000. In quarter 1 of 1999 a certain number of tools were purchased and a new
forecasts for quarters Q2 1999 to Q4 2000 were placed.
Figure 2 depicts the forecasts as provided by the buyer in the quarters Q1 1999 to
Q1 2001. Each of these shared forecasts is a time series consisting of the seven quarters
included in the relevant forecast window. Figure 2 also contrasts the forecasts with the
actual tool purchases. We can make two interesting observations. First, the forecasts
vary widely, both over time (what is forecasted in e.g. Q1 2000 for the time period of
Q2 2000 to Q4 2001) as well as from one forecast to the next (e.g. what is forecasted in
e.g. Q2 1999 for Q4 1999 vs. what is forecasted in Q3 1999 for Q4 1999). The former is
a consequence of the lifecycle of process generations and the associated need for capacity
expansion. The latter is primarily a result of the inherent uncertainty in the industry,
especially with respect to the height of the peak demand in the product lifecycle.
Second, we see that - on average - the buyer forecasted for more tool purchases than
he ended up ultimately committing to. In other words, there are significantly more soft
orders than hard orders, leading to numerous order cancellations. In our dataset, 30% of
the soft orders were cancelled. This reflects the cost structure of the buyer: forecasting too
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few can lead to equipment shortages and potential production losses of the entire wafer
fab with a substantial negative financial impact. Forecasting too many however does not
directly cost the buyer. This is so because the risk of producing the equipment without
having the demand for it is entirely bore by the supplier.
2.3 Research Goals
While a systemic inflation of forecasts does not necessarily lead to out-of-pocket costs to
the buyer, it can have negative implications on the supplier’s perception of the buyer’s
credibility. This in turn can hurt overall supply chain performance, and thereby - albeit
indirectly - the buyer.
The objective of this article is to measure how the semiconductor equipment supplier we
studied perceived the cost of cancellation and holding relative to the cost of late shipment.
While previous research on coordination and contracting in supply chains has emphasized
the importance of forecast sharing and the risks associated with losing credibility, we
provide - to our knowledge - the first empirical study to demonstrate these eﬀects econo-
metrically based on actual supply chain behavior opposed to anecdotal evidence. Our
results are of direct managerial relevance to the semiconductor equipment supply chain,
as they demonstrate that the supplier does not perceive the shared forecasts as credible,
which makes the process of forecast sharing by and large ineﬀective.
3 Related Literature
Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang (1997) provide one of the earliest academic discussion
of problems related to soft orders and their cancellation. They refer to such orders as
“phantom orders”, defined as high forecasts of future demand that never materializes, and
see them as a key contributor to the bullwhip eﬀect in supply chains.
Problems relating to phantom orders and overly optimistic forecasts have frequently
made their way into the business news. For example, Zarley and Damore (Computer Re-
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seller News; May 6, 1996) discuss how PC manufacturers suspected that their customers
(distributors) placed phantom orders. As a result, these manufacturers frequently produce
only a fraction of the quantity specified in the demand forecast. A comparable situation
occurred in the cellular phone industry in the 1994 Christmas season. Motorola experi-
enced significant over-ordering by customers concerned with a potential capacity short-fall
(Business Week, March 6, 1995).
Similar problems were experienced at Boeing, which had diﬃculties in increasing its
production of 747s due to parts shortages. Boeing’s large supplier base apparently did not
trust the company’s optimistic demand forecast (indicating a strong growth in 1997) and
therefore could not fulfill Boeing’s large orders. Only one year later though, following the
Asian financial crisis, the supplier’s conservatism proved to be a wise decision (Cole, Wall
Street Journal, June 26 and September 16, 1997; Biddle, Wall Street Journal, June 10,
1998).
Boeing not only experienced the problem of forecast credibility with their suppliers,
but - at the same time - also with their customers. For example, in May 2001, Northwest
Airlines cancelled a soft order of 23 Boeing 737 jets, which led Boeing to fall behind Airbus
for the first time (Flight International, June 2001).
In addition to this anecdotal evidence on problems related to forecast sharing, the re-
cent academic literature of supply chain management includes several articles providing
game theoretical models of this behavior2. Closest to our study, Cachon and Lariviere
(2001) distinguish between forecast sharing contracts with forced compliance and volun-
tary compliance. Under forced compliance, the supplier’s behavior can be observed and
compared to the contracted behavior with a level of detail suﬃcient for any deviations to
be brought up in court. In this case, all market power rests with the buyer and he will
therefore design a contract that maximizes his rent derived from the relationship.
Under voluntary compliance, the supplier’s behavior is not fully verifiable. This might
be a result of some stochastic element in the environment or within the supplier’s opera-
2Chen 2002 provides an excellent review on research in the area of sharing information within a supply
chain. Our paper falls into its category of sharing downstream demand forecast information.
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tions. In such a situation, courts cannot enforce contract compliance, as the supplier can
always argue that she attempted to comply but failed because of some random event.
The situation analyzed in this article is one of voluntary compliance. While there are
detailed contracts written between buyer and supplier, they are very hard to enforce. For
example, if the supplier is not able to meet the requested delivery date, she could easily
find reasons outside her control to explain this. Examples include parts shortages from
the second tier supplier, changing delivery dates from the buyer, and/or other external
events.
A second stream of research that is relevant to our work relates to the sharing of prelim-
inary information, which is a common practice in product development teams, especially
in those proceeding concurrently. Similar to the supplier in our study, who initiates the
order fulfillment process prior to receiving a firm purchase order from the customer, de-
velopment teams frequently begin their work on a new product prior to receiving detailed
design specifications from the customer and/or from the market research department.
In this line of research, Krishnan, Eppinger, and Whitney (1997) and Loch and Ter-
wiesch (1998) model the situation faced by a concurrent engineering team where an in-
formation receiving development activity must decide on how to rely on the preliminary
information provided by the information sender. The information receiver always wants
to start early, in an attempt to gain from parallel task execution. Starting early how-
ever uses a lower quality of information and thus has a higher likelihood of costly rework.
Consequently, the information receiver faces the dilemma “Rush and be Wrong or Wait
and be Late” (Terwiesch, Meyer, and Loch 2002). This fundamental trade-oﬀ is similar
to the supplier’s problem as described above and formalized below. A similar tradeoﬀ is
also found in the development of new products (see for example, Cohen, Eliashberg, and
Ho 1996).
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4 Model Formulation
Our objective is to estimate the unobservable costs of cancellation, holding, and delay
used by the supplier. We had observed the supply chain dyad, including shared forecasts
and final shipments, over an extended period of time. In addition, we had also obtained
data about the supplier’s internal manufacturing lead-times. Under the assumption that
the supplier would behave rationally in balancing the three cost elements, we wanted to
impute values for the costs that explained observed supply chain behavior.
The unit of analysis in both our model and the empirical analysis is an order for a single
piece of production equipment. The goal of the supplier is to choose a time to commence
work on a given order in order to minimize the total costs.
4.1 The Supplier’s Problem
Consider a time line (see Figure 3) starting at the point in time when the first soft order
is received by the supplier (t = 0). Associated with this first, preliminary order is a
Requested Delivery Date (RDD), which is potentially refined by the buyer over time. At
some point in time the uncertainty inherent in the soft order is resolved. Define this point
in time as t = TN . At TN , the tool delivery is requested with a firm delivery date for
t = RDDN , or the order is cancelled, in which case we define RDDN as infinity.
The supplier faces the following problem when deciding about the time Tp at which
she begins the fulfillment process on a - potentially soft - order. Specifically, she faces
two types of uncertainty, market uncertainty and uncertainty in manufacturing lead-time.
Market uncertainty includes the probability that the order is cancelled, which we will label
as p, as well as any potential changes in the requested delivery date RDDN .
From the operations side, the supplier faces uncertainty in the manufacturing lead-time.
This may result from traditional lead-time variability in their job-shop like production
environment, changes in product mix or production volume, and/or from variability in
delivery lead-times for sub-systems that are ordered from second tier suppliers.
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The supplier must trade-oﬀ the cost of beginning too early (cancellation and holding)
with the risk of producing too late (delay cost). The problem resembles a traditional
newsvendor problem, which occurs in the time domain as opposed to the usual quantity
domain. Define cancellation cost, c, as the cost incurred by the supplier per unit of time
that an order spends in production and later is cancelled. Cancellation costs include the
cost for labor and material for an order that the supplier has started to work on. This
includes component orders to second tier suppliers that the supplier has to either return
(at a charge) or to hold in inventory. Cancellation cost also includes the opportunity cost
of not using the capacity for other orders.
Define holding cost, h, as the cost incurred by the supplier per unit of time that the
tool is produced prior to the date the customer actually needs it, RDDN . Holding cost
is driven primarily by the capital cost for the expensive equipment, but also includes the
cost of storing the equipment. Finally, define delay cost, g, as the cost incurred by the
supplier per unit of time that the actual delivery date exceeds the RDDN , i.e. for the
shipment being late. Note that - since our model takes the perspective of the supplier
- these delay costs do not capture the delay cost of the buyer, who potentially loses the
output of an entire production line as a result of a late shipment. Although the buyer
does not face an immediate threat of substitution in the case of late deliveries (due to the
single sourcing policy adopted by the buyer), poor delivery performance will impact the
supplier’s likelihood of receiving contracts for future tool types and technologies.
The various cost components, including cancellation cost, holding cost, and delay cost,
are illustrated in Figure 3. While it might be possible to measure holding cost from
the cost of capital, machine price, and depreciation, the other two costs (delay cost and
cancellation costs) are intangible, and hard to measure directly.
With these cost parameters, we can state the supplier’s decision problem as follows:
MinTp E(Total Cost) = pc (TN − Tp)
+ (1)
+(1− p)
©
h [(RDDN − LT )− Tp]+ + g [Tp − (RDDN − LT )]+
ª
where (.)+ denotes Max(., 0). In the equation above, the first term denotes the expected
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cancellation cost while the second and the third term capture expected holding cost and
expected delay cost respectively. We assume that all three costs are linearly increasing
with time. This assumption is necessary in order to obtain closed-form solutions that make
the estimation easier. The assumption could be relaxed, if the objective were to provide
operational support for the supplier concerning the decision of when to begin work on
a forecasted order. In such a context, one would have to collect additional data about
the detailed shape of the cost accumulation functions. While holding costs indeed are
likely to accumulate linearly in practice, the shape of the cancellation cost curve is likely
to be lumpy. For example, upon starting on a forecasted order, the supplier is likely to
experience an over-proportionally high upfront cost for procurement of components.
Define S = RDDN − LT, and let the cumulative distribution for the new random
variable be F (S). Moreover, let the distribution for TN be G(.). Equation (1) can be
rewritten as:
MinTp E(Total Cost) = pc
Z ∞
Tp
(TN − Tp) dG(TN) (2)
+(1− p)
"
h
Z ∞
Tp
(S − Tp) dF (S) + g
Z Tp
−∞
(Tp − S)dF (S)
#
It is easy to show that (2) is convex in the decision variable Tp. Thus, there exists a
unique cost minimizing starting point T ∗p at which the supplier should begin production
of an order, which is characterized by the solution to the first order condition:
pcG(T ∗p ) + (1− p)(g + h)F (T ∗p ) = pc+ (1− p)h (3)
Define the expected delay time at the optimal decision as
V (T ∗p ) = E[LT − (RDDN − T ∗p )]+ =
Z T∗p
−∞
(T ∗p − S)dF (S). (4)
It is easy to show that V (T ∗p ) is non-increasing with the delay cost, non-decreasing with
the cancellation cost and non-decreasing with the holding cost, i.e.,
∂V (T∗p )
∂g ≤ 0,
∂V (T∗p )
∂c ≥ 0,
and
∂V (T∗p )
∂h ≥ 0. The same is true for T ∗p , i.e.,
∂T∗p
∂g ≤ 0,
∂T∗p
∂c ≥ 0, and
∂T∗p
∂h ≥ 0.
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4.2 Functional Forms
In order to empirically reconstruct the cost parameters c, h, and g, we need to make
specific assumptions concerning the underlying distribution function for the arrival time
of finalized information, TN , and for the distribution function underlying S. For the
arrival time of finalized ordering information, TN , we assume an exponential distribution.
Specifically, we assume G(x) = 1 − e−αx. Figure 4 compares the actual data that we
collected in the semiconductor equipment supply chain with an exponential distribution
where α = 0.21. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the underlying distribution is exponential.
Next, we need to specify a distribution function for S = RDDN − LT . Testing sepa-
rately, we find both RDDN and LT are normally distributed. So a natural assumption
would be to assume S = RDDN − LT is normally distributed. However, the normality
assumption makes the model less tractable and therefore, in estimation problems similar
to ours, a Weibull(2, β) distribution is used instead. This distribution is also called the
Rayleigh distribution.
In our context it is possible for RDDN − LT to take on negative values, so we shift
the Rayleigh distribution to the right by a constant δ. The exact value of this shift
δ will be estimated jointly with the three cost parameters defined above. While the
resulting distribution of S no longer is a Weibull distribution, it still has a relatively
simple cumulative distribution function, with F (S) = 1− e−β2(S+δ)2.
Substituting the functional forms into equation (3) we obtain a simplified first order
condition:
pce−αTp + (1− p)(g + h)e−β2(Tp+δ)2 = (1− p)g (5)
4.3 Optimality Condition and Taylor Approximation
In order to generate a closed form solution, we linearize the objective function in the
neighborhood of a target starting date. We show in the Appendix that Taylor approx-
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imation provides a reasonably good approximation and the solution obtained from the
approximation is close to the true optimum value. Let the target starting time be τ
around which we expand the exponential function in the above equation (below we set
τ to be 3 months in our estimation). That is, e−αTp = e−ατ − αe−ατ(Tp − τ) + rG, and
e−β
2(Tp+δ)2 = e−β
2(τ+δ)2−2β2(τ+δ)e−β2(τ+δ)2(Tp−τ)+rF , where rG and rF are the residual
terms for those two expressions. The resulting first order equation is
pc [e−ατ − αe−ατ(Tp − τ) + rG]
+(1− p)(g + h)
h
e−β
2(τ+δ)2 − 2β2(τ + δ)e−β2(τ+δ)2(Tp − τ) + rF
i
= (1− p)g
(6)
For ease of presentation, define θ1 = pc, θ2 = (1 − p)(g + h), and θ3 = (1 − p)g. Note
that g, h, and c, our key parameters of interest, can be fully recovered from θ1, θ2, and θ3:
g = θ3/(1− p); h = (θ2 − θ3)/(1− p); c = θ1/p.
Re-arranging terms, we obtain the following closed-form solution for T ∗p :
T ∗p =
θ1e−ατ + θ1αe−αττ + θ2e−β
2(τ+δ)2 + 2θ2τβ2(τ + δ)e−β
2(τ+δ)2 − θ3
θ1αe−ατ + 2θ2β2(τ + δ)e−β
2(τ+δ)2
(7)
Our approximation approach has a direct analogy in the order fulfillment process of
the supplier under study. The supplier has a predefined milestone at which she initiates
the manufacturing process. This milestone is then adjusted to reflect order specific con-
siderations, technical tool characteristics, shipment destination, or tool function. This is
a natural analogy to Taylor series expansion, where an objective function can be approx-
imated in the neighborhood of a given point, and actions can be adjusted in relation to
that given point to improve the objective.
5 Estimation
We observed the semiconductor equipment supply chain at the interface of the buyer and
the supplier for a total of 18 months, beginning in January 1999. For this time period, we
created a complete history of forecast sharing via direct access to the on-line collaboration
system described above. The buyer of the supply chain updates the on-line collaboration
system on a monthly basis, providing the latest forecasts in the form of soft orders.
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The system enables us to follow every individual equipment order from its initiation
as a soft order to the completion of the installation and qualification procedure. For
every order, we collected information on its total order lead time (from the time an order
enters the system to the time it is fulfilled), the process technology generation that the
equipment was designed to support, the function of the equipment, and the destination
(geographic location of the fab) to which the equipment is to be delivered. As we collected
the data over an extended period of time, we were also able to observe information about
order cancellations and requested changes to the delivery date. This database provided
an accurate description of forecast sharing between buyer and supplier. The total number
of soft orders in the sample was 143, of which 100 were firm orders.
5.1 Estimation Procedure
Assume that α and β, the parameters for G(.) and F (.) respectively, vary across orders and
that this variation can be explained by a set of independent variables. Let the observations
corresponding to the individual pieces of equipment be indexed as i = 1, 2, . . . , I , and
explanatory variables be indexed as j = 1, 2, . . . , J . Let any given αi > 0 consist of a
“base rate” γ0 , and an order-specific term which can be explained by a set of values of
xij, j = 1, . . . , J . In other words, αi can be written as:
αi = exp(γ0 + γ1xi1 + ...+ γJxiJ) (8)
The approach of using covariates to endogenize a distribution parameter is common in
empirical marketing models as well as operations research models. See Duenyas (1995) for
an example of a customer arrival rate which is explained through various attributes of the
customer. Similarly we define βi > 0 as:
βi = exp(ρ0 + ρ1xi1 + ...+ ρJxiJ) (9)
Our notation can be further simplified by labelling the explanatory variables in vector
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form as Xi = (1, xi1, ..., xiK)0, a J × 1 vector for αi and a J × 1 vector for βi:
αi = exp(γXi)
βi = exp(ρXi)
(10)
Where γ and ρ are the respective parameters vectors of dimension 1× J to be estimated.
A complication arises in our empirical estimation. We did not have data on Tp,i (the
supplier involved in this study did not keep the data). Consequently, we need to estimate
the model using finishing time as follows. Denote FTi to be the finishing time of order i
(on which we had data), and let LTi be the manufacturing lead time of order i (on which
we did not have data). We have the following identity:
FTi = Tp,i + LTi (11)
That is, finishing time equals to starting time plus lead time. Let Yi indicate a set of
variables that influence manufacturing lead-times. Then we can predict LTi based on the
following regression model:
LTi = ηYi (12)
where η is the parameter vector to be estimated3. To control for potential change in
capacity utilization over time, we include a dummy variable for each half year in the
regression model. We also estimated our model with quarterly and bimonthly dummies,
and found the resulting estimates to be robust.
We assume that the finishing time FT is normally distributed.
FTi ∼ N(µi, σ2) (13)
The normality assumption is common in regression analysis. To validate this assumption,
in section 7 (Model Validation) we formally test this assumption, where we find that
normality assumption cannot be rejected. Using our previous results, we can predict the
expected finishing time µi as follows:
3We fitted quadratic, cubic, and log specifications to our model, but none of them improved the model
fit significantly. Therefore, we keep the linear specification in this paper.
17
µi =
θ1e− exp(γXi)τ + θ1 exp(γXi)e− exp(γXi)ττ + θ2e− exp
2(ρXi)(τ+δ)2
θ1 exp(γXi)e− exp(γXi)τ + 2θ2 exp2(ρXi)(τ + δ)e− exp
2(ρXi)(τ+δ)2
(14)
+
2θ2τ exp2(ρXi)(τ + δ)e− exp
2(ρXi)(τ+δ)2 − θ3
θ1 exp(γXi)e− exp(γXi)τ + 2θ2 exp2(ρXi)(τ + δ)e− exp
2(ρXi)(τ+δ)2
+ ηYi
When estimating finishing times, one cannot assume that two subsequent finishing
times are independent of each other. Because of potential capacity constraints and / or
congestion eﬀects, a longer than average finishing time of the n-th order would - everything
else equal - increase the likelihood of a longer than average finishing time of the (n+1)-st
order. We therefore need to consider a joint distribution between FTi and FTi+1. Given
the normality assumption of the finishing times, FT, discussed above, we use a bivariate
normal distribution (BVN) and specify (FTi, FTi+1) ∼ BVN(µi, µi+1, σ2, σ2, λ), where λ
is correlation coeﬃcient. It follows that
FTi+1|FTi ∼ N(µ0i+1, σ02) (15)
where µ0i+1 = µi+1 + λ(FTi − µi), σ02 = σ2(1− λ2) (16)
Therefore we can obtain the joint likelihood function:
L = f(FT1, FT2, ...FTn) (17)
= f(FT1)f(FT2|FT1)...f(FTn|FTn−1)
where f(FTi+1|FTi) is the density to (15)
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method can now be readily applied to obtain
parameter estimates.
6 Estimation Results
We use four explanatory variables to predict the dependent lead time variable LT (mea-
sured in months): tool generation, tool functionality, tool destination, and forecast changes.
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Tool generation is a binary variable, which is set equal to one if the tool is a newly in-
troduced technology. At the time of our study, one tool type was a new generation and
- based on our interviews - we expected this tool generation to have a longer lead-times.
Second, some tools in our sample are CMP (Chemical Mechanical Planarization) tools,
which are considered premium tools in the industry and our interviews suggested that
these tools would have longer lead-times. We define a binary variable PREMIUM that
takes on a value of 1 if the tool is of such function, and zero otherwise. Third, we expect
tools ordered from and delivered to development fabs to exhibit a shorter lead time. So
we include this binary variable DEVFAB to capture this eﬀect. Fourth, our interviews
indicated that during the delivery of production tools, changes with respect to RDD were
of much higher importance than changes in equipment specifications4, therefore we include
CHRDD as one key explanatory variable. Extent and frequency of forecast change in our
data set are highly correlated (with correlation at about 60%). They both measure the
degree of volatility of forecast changes. For this reason, we only focus on the frequency
(CHRDD).
Finally, we control for the potential eﬀect of capacity constraints at the supplier and
their impact on manufacturing lead time, by including fixed eﬀects into our model. For
example, if capacity was constrained during the first half-year of 2000, then a dummy
variable for that half year would pick up the capacity eﬀect in our sample. Note also that
the correlation coeﬃcient, λ, between two successive orders captures potential congestion
eﬀects at the supplier’s operation.
The explanatory variables for α and β are similar to the ones introduced in the re-
gression on LT , namely, process generation (NEW), tool function (PREMIUM), and tool
destination (DEVFAB). The correlation matrix of explanatory variables is reported in
Table 1.
Like any other empirical study, our model can omit other crucial variables. To partly
4We did not consider changes in product specification because they are extremely rare in our context.
The buyer follows a strategy in which every piece of production equipment has to be exactly the same,
thus potential changes in specifications impact both new and existing tools.
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address this problem, we have conducted extensive interviews with both buyer and sup-
plier, attempting to identify “qualitative” factors that we have not included in the analysis.
One of the authors was on-site for several months, while the other authors had weekly tele-
phone meetings and had made several visits to various factory locations involved in this
research. We observed that several crucial variables that could influence lead time such
as leadership in buyer and supplier organizations, task division within both organizations,
and the relationship between the dyad were kept constant over the course of our study.
As MLE is a nonlinear method, results can sometimes be sensitive to starting points5.
In order to ensure the parameter estimates are not only locally optimal, we explored
the parameter space by testing various sets of starting values. Specifically, we randomly
generate 12000 sets of starting values with each of the parameters drawn from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 3, which covers the typical range of the
parameter values from our observation. θ3 is fixed at 0.700 (or equivalently g = 1.000)
for identification. We also restrict g, h and c to be non-negative. Table 2 reports the
parameter estimates that yielded the globally maximum likelihood.
Converting estimated values for θ1, θ2, and θ3 into cost parameters g, h and c, we
obtain the following values: g = 1.000, h = 3.031, c = 2.108. These results suggest that
the manufacturer weighs the holding and cancellation costs about three and two times
higher than the cost of delay.
In order to test the eﬀect of explanatory variables on the model, we test the following
sequence of nested models:
1. Tool Destination: DEVFAB. The corresponding hypothesis is H0,1 : γ2 = 0, and
ρ2 = 0.
2. Tool Process Generation: NEW. The corresponding hypothesis is H0,2 : γ3 = 0, and
ρ3 = 0.
3. Tool type: PREMIUM. The corresponding hypothesis is H0,3 : γ4 = 0, and ρ4 = 0.
5We use GAUSS, a matrix programming language, to perform the estimation task. The algorithm for
maximum likelihood estimation is BFGS.
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The results for those hypotheses tests are reported in Table 3. Likelihood ratio tests
show that each of the hypotheses is rejected (see χ2 test statistic in each table). Thus,
all the variables have indeed predictive power in explaining lead-time.
The parameter values of the dummy variables associated with time show that the ca-
pacity constraint does vary over time. The first half year of 1999 appears to have the
most constrained capacity. However the maximal diﬀerence in lead time across these fixed
eﬀects is 0.7 month (the average manufacturing lead time is 4.5 months). So we conclude
that the capacity constraint aﬀects the lead time but not substantially. This is also con-
sistent with the modest estimate on the correlation coeﬃcient of finishing time. In-depth
interviews with the managers at the supplier provide a plausible explanation. Apparently,
orders from the buyer always receive a priority in production scheduling because he is the
largest customer of the supplier. In fact, a special unit of marketing support was set up
within the supplier organization specifically to facilitate the order fulfillment process of
the buyer.
7 Model Validation
We first validate our normality assumption. We perform both Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-
of-fit test and the Chi-square test as described in Law and Kelton (1991). In both cases,
the normality hypothesis could not be rejected. We also draw Q-Q plot and distribution
plot of residuals (Figure 5), providing also a graphical support for the normality assump-
tion.
To further validate our model, we compare the finish time dFT as predicted by our
model, with actual finish time FT . Based on the estimates bθ1, bθ2, bθ3, bγ, bρ, bδ, and bη, we
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obtain a predicted value of FT :
dFT i = bTpi + cLT (18)
=
bθ1e− exp(bγXi)τ + bθ1 exp(bγXi)e− exp(bγXi)ττ + bθ2e− exp2(bρXi)(τ+bδ)2bθ1 exp(bγXi)e− exp(bγXi)τ + 2bθ2 exp2(bρXi)2(τ + bδ)e− exp2(bρXi)(τ+bδ)2
+2bθ2τ exp2(bρXi)(τ + bδ)e− exp2(bρXi)(τ+bδ)2 − bθ3bθ1 exp(bγXi)e− exp(bγXi)τ + 2bθ2 exp2(bρXi)(τ + bδ)e− exp2(bρXi)(τ+bδ)2 + bηYi
Figure 6 compares actual values FT and predicted valuesdFT . The graph shows an
overall good fit with no apparent systemic deviation from the identity line. An Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) regression of FT againstdFT confirms this observation:
FT = 0.000 + 0.999∗dFT (19)
*:Significant at 1% level
R2=40%; Number of observations=100. F-statistic: 137.97.
The results show an intercept that is statistically not diﬀerent from zero (p value=1.00),
and a positive and significant slope (p value=0.00). We conduct a test to check whether
the slope is diﬀerent from 1, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that slope is one (p
value=0.63). We also use White’s General Test (p.550 in Greene, 1993) to test het-
eroskedasticity, and could not reject the hypothesis that residuals are homoskedastic.
8 Policy Scenario Simulation
Our mathematical model outlined in Section 4, combined with the parameter estimates
for cancellation cost, holding cost, and delay cost, enable us to analyze how modifications
of cost parameters would impact the supplier’s expected delivery performance. Note that
the following analysis has been performed based on the cost parameters we obtained for
the supply chain dyad underlying the present research study. While this methodology is
generalizable beyond this setting, the magnitude of the following eﬀects are likely to vary
across diﬀerent supply chain settings.
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The buyer in our study was interested in the question of what would be the impact of a
financial late shipment fee on the timeliness of deliveries. Economic intuition suggests that
such penalty would increase the late shipment cost for the supplier, thereby encouraging
her to commence production earlier (smaller T ∗p ). However, we can go one step further
than this. Based on our analytical results and the empirical data, we can recompute the
expected shipping delay with any given late shipment cost parameter. This is depicted by
Figure 7a, which shows the relationship between the cost parameter g and the expected
slippage, as defined in Equation (4), averaged over all orders and expressed in month.
Currently, g = 1 and the corresponding slippage is a little less than 0.4 month. Increasing
late shipment cost from g = 1 to g = 2 translates into a .15 month reduction in late
shipment.
Next, consider the impact of holding cost h on the expected shipping delay (Figure
7b). Again, the status quo corresponds to h = 3 and a delay of .34 months. Now
consider what happens if holding costs are cut in half. For example, the buyer could
accept the equipment prior to the specified requested dock date (and of course, also pay
for it earlier). Alternatively, the buyer could partially reimburse the supplier for the
holding costs. Reducing holding costs from 3 to 1 would lead to a .1 month reduction in
shipping delay. While, obviously the financial burden of capital cost now rest with the
buyer (who pays for the equipment and then leaves it idle up to the time of actual need),
the buyer might still be better oﬀ, as shipment delays can put the production of entire
fabs at risk, thereby having a much larger impact on the bottom line.
Similarly, Figure 7c and 7d investigate the relationship between changes in cancellation
cost c and cancellation probability p. A reduction in cancellation cost could be achieved,
if the buyer would take over some of the cost incurred by the seller in the case of can-
cellation (e.g., procurement cost). Alternatively, the buyer could develop specifications
with more standardized components in it, which would allow the supplier to reuse entire
sub-assemblies for another customer after receiving notice of cancellation.
Interestingly, none of the cost changes outlined above is able to eliminate the expected
delay. The reason for this lies in the complex trade-oﬀ that the supplier faces when
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deciding upon the optimal time to start working on an order T ∗p . This trade-oﬀ not only
involves two forces, but rests on a subtle balance between three forces. Hence, even a
large improvement along one dimension will only lead to a small change in the supplier’s
decision - and thereby the expected delay - as the other two forces are still unchanged.
Consequently, substantial changes in expected delay can only be achieved by changing at
least two of the cost parameters jointly (opposed to changing them one at a time). This
is illustrated in Figure 8. We see that reductions in holding cost and in cancellation costs
actually complement each other, opposed to acting as substitutes. A 50% reduction in
both of them (h = 1.5, c = 1) would reduce the expected delay by .15 months, while the
two changes implemented individually would lead to a lower reduction of the delay (.1
months for the reduction in h and .03 for the reduction in c). That is, the joint changes
are super-additive.
9 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results indicate that the supplier fears holding costs and order cancellations, making
her averse to commencing order fulfillment based on soft orders. This results from the fact
that the supplier’s eﬀort, including procurement of components and the actual building of
the equipment, is very customer specific. We also find that the supplier perceives holding
cost and cancellation cost as much more important relative to the cost of delay.
The large emphasis on early completion cost relative to late completion cost clearly does
not mirror the overall cost for the supply chain. If the tool is finished early, it remains at
the supplier’s plant and only traditional inventory holding costs are incurred. However, a
late shipment of the tool can lead to idle time and lost output at the buyer’s fab, which
is associated with substantial margin losses which are magnitudes larger than the holding
cost for a piece of equipment. This suggests there is a lack of coordination in the supply
chain which can lead to sub-optimal performance.
The current situation can be partly explained by the fact that the customer in this
study is a dominant player in semiconductor products, and is the single largest customer
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of the supplier. This creates an imbalance of power in the buyer-supplier relationship,
which is why the customer can provide forecasts without commitment, and can change
order forecasts without penalty, leaving the supplier bear all the resulting costs.
The overall supply chain performance could be improved if the customer would be
willing to share some of the holding cost. One operational way of doing this would be
if the customer accepted the tool delivery for some time window prior to the RDD. This
would reduce the expected holding cost for the supplier and thereby move the optimal
starting point T ∗p forward in time. In general, given the high degree of customization
demanded by the buyer, supply chain performance also could potentially be improved if
the buyer would be ready to share some of the risk of cancellation. This would have
two beneficial eﬀects. First, it would reduce the supplier’s cancellation cost, moving the
optimal starting point T ∗p forward in time. Second, it would make the forecast more
credible, and thereby rebuild some of the trust missing in the system. In presence of a
cancellation fee, phantom orders become costly to the buyer, allowing the supplier to have
more confidence in the soft orders. Currently, forecasts are provided by the individual
fabs of the customer. While all fabs are part of the same company, they also have local
objectives. In such a setting, those fabs do not incur the full negative externalities that
cancellation has on the reputation of the company as a whole. This suggests that a better
coordination of forecasting activities across fabs could be beneficial.
The sharing of demand forecast information does not have a positive value for the
supplier, who distrusts these data and delays the production start for the equipment. In
our situation of voluntary compliance (the buyer cannot monitor the supplier), financial
incentives are needed to make signals related to the forecast credible (Cachon and Lariviere
2001). As the buyer, who is in control over the design of the coordinating mechanisms in
the supply chain, does not incur any financial loss in case of a cancellation, such credible
signaling is not possible. This would change if the buyer would pay some cancellation fee
(potentially as a function of time). While having the right of free cancellation obviously
is attractive to the buyer and potentially saves him some direct out-of-pocket cost, the
buyer pays a (much higher) price indirectly, resulting from shipment delays and long tool
25
delivery lead-times generated by the supplier’s response to the current system structure.
We believe that these results are of substantial interest, both from an academic as well
as from a direct managerial perspective. On the academic side, these results provide the
first econometric evidence of problems related to forecast sharing. While there is a rapidly
growing stream of research following Lee et al. (1997), no previous study could econo-
metrically demonstrate the existence of the coordination problems. While the magnitude
of the parameter estimates we report in this study is specific to our research setting, our
method can easily be implemented to obtain estimates in other supply chain dyads.
From a managerial perspective, our results demonstrate that information sharing by
itself is not suﬃcient to build superior supply chain performance. Our results were pre-
sented to senior executives at both the customer and the supplier. In response to our
study, the customer started several projects with the objective to overcome some of the
credibility problems. For example, one project that the customer initiated attempts to ac-
knowledge the uncertainty inherent in forecasts by communicating it explicitly via a range
of possible orders (an interval) as opposed to ignoring it (simply sharing point-based fore-
casts). In the context of product development, such set-based information exchange has
been documented to lead to improved performance.
Finally, we believe that our work not only serves as the empirical foundation for much
of the contracting research, but that it also provides a fruitful starting point for future
research. A larger empirical study could analyze how the cost parameters that we esti-
mated change over time. For example, one would expect that the cancellation of an order
directly increased the supplier’s perception of cancellation cost in the subsequent period.
Another interesting research opportunity relates to how the forecast is shared. Similar
to the field of concurrent product development discussed in the literature review, where
there has been a recent trend towards set-based - opposed to point-based - information
exchange, the buyer could provide multiple scenarios of demand to the supplier or could
even share a confidence interval. This would be consistent with established supply chain
concepts such as minimum purchase commitments and its eﬀect on forecast credibility
would be interesting to study both analytically as well as empirically.
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Appendix: Taylor Expansion
The function we want to approximate is Equation (5), the first order condition for the
cost minimization problem.
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pce−αTp + (1− p)(g + h)e−β2(Tp+δ)2 = (1− p)g
As before, denote: 


θ1 = pc
θ2 = (1− p)(g + h)
θ3 = (1− p)g
We can rewrite the first order condition in the form of f(x) = 0, i.e.,
f(x) = θ1e−αTp + θ2e−β
2(Tp+δ)2 − θ3 = 0
Note that f(x) is monotonically decreasing in Tp. Approximate f(x) around a given
point τ by the tangent line, f
0
(x), passing through (τ, f(τ)). Solving f
0
(x) = 0 will give
us the approximated solution T
0
p where
lim
τ→T∗p
T
0
p = T
∗
p
Ideally we want T
0
p to be close to T
∗
p . We conducted a numerical study, to confirm this
proximity for a wide set of parameter ranges, including cases where τ diﬀers significantly
from T ∗p . Towards this goal, we first randomly sampled diﬀerent parameter values, and
obtained T ∗p numerically. Next, we calculate the approximated solution T
0
p for the given
value of τ .
The numerical study shows that for most of the parameter values, T
0
p performs reason-
ably well. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 8. In the example, the true solution
is T ∗p is 3. Varying τ between 2 and 4 does not lead to big changes in T
0
p, whose values
remain in the interval [2.6, 3]. In general, we find that for the parameter settings in our
study, varying τ by ±30% still yields approximated solutions, T 0p, that are within 10% of
the optimal solution T ∗p . Thus, Taylor approximation indeed provides a good representa-
tion of the original problem.
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Figure 8   Joint Impact of cancellation cost c and holding cost h on expected delay
 DEVFAB NEW PREMIUM CHRDD 
DEVFAB   1.000 0.247 0.096 -0.165 
NEW   0.247 1.000 -0.074 -0.175 
PREMIUM   0.096 -0.074 1.000 0.150 
CHRDD  -0.165 -0.175 0.150 1.000 
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix
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The parameter values for the four series shown above are:  { θ1, θ2, θ3, α, β, δ} = {1,1,0.37,1.1,0.3,0.5}, 
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Figure 8   Taylor Approximation
Table 2. Parameter Estimation Results:  Full Model
  1-step Estimation 
    Estimate Std. Err. p-value 
g 1.000 (N/A) (N/A) 
h 3.031 0.013 0.002 
Im
pu
te
d 
C
os
t  
c 2.108 0.003 0.010 
Leadtime shift δ 0.068 0.017 0.000 
Standard deviation σ 3.000 0.003 0.000 
Constant γ1 -1.085 0.005 0.000 
Develop γ2 -4.326 0.005 0.000 
New γ3 -0.388 0.003 0.000 
Premium γ4 -9.721 0.003 0.000 
Constant ρ1 0.827 0.004 0.000 
Develop ρ2 -2.427 0.004 0.000 
New ρ3 -0.098 0.003 0.000 
T p
 
Premium ρ4 -2.284 0.004 0.000 
Constant η1 4.945 0.004 0.000 
CHRDD η2 0.966 0.004 0.000 
Develop η3 -3.024 0.003 0.000 
New η4 0.691 0.004 0.000 
Premium η4 -0.435 0.003 0.000 
1HALF98 η5 1.978 0.003 0.000 
2HALF98 η6 1.545 0.003 0.000 
LT
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
 
1HALF99 η7 1.212 0.003 0.000 
Correlation coefficient λ 0.207 0.003 0.000 
Log Likelihood -227.211 
 
Table 3. Nested Models
Model Log-Likelihood χ2-test statistic p-value 
Full Model -227.211   
Nested 1: DEVFAB -232.952 11.482 0.003 
Nested 2: NEW -234.230 14.038 0.001 
Nested 3: PREMIUM -233.347 12.272 0.002 
 
